# Data Sharing and Trading

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Based largely on Seim, Bergemann, Crawford, Crémer, Dinielli, Fletcher, Groh, Heidhues, Schaefer, Schnitzer, Scott Morton, and Sullivan (Forthcoming, Yale Journal of Regulation):

Market Design for Personal Data.

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*"The world's most valuable resource is no longer oil, but data."* (The Economist, 2017)

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#### Huge realized and potential benefits!

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  - No presumption that we should interfere only if "market failure".

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- "Behavioral / default effects" crucial regarding consumer choices.
  - Google pays a large fraction of its revenue on Apple devices to be default. Why?

GDPR: personal data is information "related to an identified or identifiable natural person".

Our definition: all data describing an individual's characteristics, transaction histories, browsing histories, etc generated by an individual (even if the actual person cannot be identified from the data generated).

• Advertiser may value information that I looked for blue shoes in Berlin even if they cannot identify me.

Consumer may oppose the collection of personal data because

• Some things are inherently "private" and do not want to share.

- Spy camera in the shower.
- Press reports on Tesla this week.
- Knowledge can be used to my disadvantage.
  - Discrimination (e.g. on sexual orientation), blackmail (stolen data).
  - Price discrimination based on willingness to pay (IO literature).
  - Inability to insure (health data).
  - May enable firms to target me with bad products (scams / bad steering).
- **③** Fear negative consequence on societal level.
  - Firms treat non-sharing customers differently.
    - Insurance markets break down (Google / Fitbit).
    - Price discrimination.
  - Firms may exploit vulnerable consumers.
    - Gambling adds targeting gambling addicts, etc....
- **④** Feel they should be reimbursed for sharing their data.

Currently, consumers can click on (confusing) pop-ups to try and make privacy choices.

- Real cost of learning about terms of service high just fiction to think consumers know it.
- With switching costs, learning only so useful as these terms can be changed at any time.
- Impossible to predict what can be inferred from what data and how secure the data is.
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Arguably, little—if any—effective privacy control.

Status quo:

- A handful of firms control vast amount of personal data, yielding significant market power.
- Users' valuable resource private data is extracted without monetary payment.
  - And the barter exchange does not seem "fair" with largest firms persistently earning billions of dollars in profits.
- Data is shared at best selectively and non-optimally.
  - Not used for public benefits (as preventing digital addiction or transportation planing) and shielded from rivals or new entrants.

A well functioning data market design should address the

- 1 failure to provide users effective control over their data;
- 2 failure to provide users a way to benefit financially;
- failure to ensure that data is put to highest use (non-profit, government, or other firms).

Users need to "negotiate collectively" to receive fair share:

- Transaction costs.
- Typically: value of a marginal consumer's data is less than the average value.
  - Often use data of a group of (similar) users to predict an individual user's behavior (incremental prediction accuracy decreases).
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Propose governments intervention to create licensed intermediaries to collect and monetize personal data on behalf of user.

- Key: prohibit any firm other than licensed intermediary from monetizing personal data or control the use of personal data (exclusive control).
- Note: web service would only be able to use an individual's data to provide the web service in question, not for targeted advertising or other commercial purposes.

#### Proposal for Data Markets: Basic Structure

- Competing intermediaries offer renumeration contracts to consumers for selling their data.
  - Reimbursement amount depends on how much data consumer is willing to share.
- Web services who want to use personal data for ads need to purchase the data from the consumer's intermediary.

Schematic identifying principal categories of participants in data intermediary markets



- deliver ordered products (shipping and billing address);
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  - Recommendations on an e-commerce site is targeting, while recom. when users have fixed subscription (Spotify or Netflix) is not.

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Allowing usage of such data will improve web services products. But

- reduces revenue that can be passed on to users; and
- intermediaries could make the data available to entrants or rivals allowing them to overcome scale disadvantages.

1 Intermediaries must be licensed.

- Strict data protection, cybersecurity and resilence standards.
- Data minimization.
- **2** Fiduciary duties and minimum payout rules (e.g. 70% of revenue).
- S Compete to be the exclusive agent of the individual once a year.
  - For personal data of individual's web devices and IoT.
  - Compete via renumeration and customer service, etc.
  - Must compete using a standardized interface (more later).
- **4** Web services and intermediaries cannot be vertically integrated.
  - Prohibitions of exclusive contracting.
  - Make sure the market for intermediaries does not monopolize.

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## Interface Design

To induce meaningfull choice, need to simplify and reduce the required choices (beyond just clear and plain language as in GDPR). We propose standardized privacy levels such as:

- **1** Tier 1:
  - basic demographics (age, gender, location at postal code level);
  - apps installed in user device.
- Tier 2 = Tier 1 + ...
  - browsing and app-usage data.
- **3** Tier 3 = Tier 2 + ...
  - approximate real-time location.
- **4** Tier 4 = Tier 3 + ... (things allowing precise attribution)
  - financial records;
  - online transactions;
  - email receipts.

Plus a compulsory Tier O for users that want to remain anonymous.

• Zero data monetization.

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Steering in above examples based on consumer mistakes or perceived rather than "true" preferences.

- Far less likely to create value.
- Perhaps allowing consumers to state interests helpful.

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• Likely helpful but we think more is desirable.