

# The Use of Experimental Evidence in Competition Policy –

## The Magna-Karmann Case

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## 1. Experiments have been used in Competition Policy

- Pioneering: Hong and Plott (1982) and Grether und Plott (1986). They supplied experimental evidence in the Ethyl case and in the Inland Water transportation case
- DG Comp referred to experimental studies regarding the Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines (2008) and in the 2009 merger Associated British Food – Gilde Bakery Ingredients (ABF - GBI)
- Further, experiments are regularly used for the design of auctions and other institutions (spectrum, CO<sub>2</sub> markets, eBay, Yahoo, irrigation systems etc.)

## 2. Why were experimental data used?

- Hong and Plott (1982):

“Theoretical arguments could be made both in favour of and against the policy, and previous **experience with the policy was not available**. The regulator was skeptical and ordered an experimental investigation”

- US Federal Communications Commission (FCC, 2002):

“The application of experimental economics is significant because of the **absence of formal economic theory**”

### 3. What are the advantages of experiments?

A. Experiments study **in isolation and under known conditions** the forces we are interested in

→ One can study the forces of interest in all else equal environments, and we can unambiguously interpret the data

B. The experimental **conditions can be manipulated** according to the relevant questions—keeping all other factors constant

→ One can study the impact several possible policy decisions, including some that cannot be observed in the field


## 4. The Magna-Karman Case

Webasto – Edscha 4 → 3  
**merger** in 01/2010

Magna – Karmann 3 → 2  
**merger** in 05/2010


Magna-Karmann Merger  
would have had two effects:

1. reduce number of firms  
3 → 2
2. create a symmetric  
market structure



**Market shares**

# Experimental evidence on “numbers effects”



Huck, Normann and Oechssler (2004): “*Two are few and four are many*”

Dolbear et al. (1968): observe the same numbers effect, keeping incentives to collude constant

## Experimental evidence on the 3 → 2 merger

- In the 3 → 2 merger, how does the reduction of # of firms interact with the change in symmetry?
- Conventional wisdom:

### **Asymmetries hinder collusion**

Formal models: Compte, Jenny and Rey (2003), Vasconcelos (2008)

- However, this is in contrast to concentration indices (HHI). **In asymmetric markets, concentration is higher *ceteris paribus***

## Experimental evidence on the 3 → 2 merger

**Fonseca and Normann (2008) experiment:** Bertrand-Edgeworth competition with inelastic demand and constant marginal cost

<b>Market</b>	<b>HHI in the experiment</b>	<b>predicted Nash price</b>	<b>observed average price</b>	<b>minimum discount factor</b>
symmetric 3 firms	3333	32.0	62.1 (18.3)	0.33
asymmetric 3 firms	3417	47.9	42.4 (19.2)	0.40
symmetric 2 firms	5000	66.0	77.9 (12.0)	0.50
asymmetric 2 firms	5555	83.0	73.9 (12.3)	0.67



## 5. Objections against experiments

### 1. Possible objections against *this* experiment:

- no buyers present in the experiment
- how severe are the capacity constraints in the CRT market?

### 2. Mainly students as participants

- no professional experience → professionals do not play differently
- low monetary incentives → high incentives do not change much
- little time to familiarize with the framework  
→ learning effects should be checked

### 3. Too simplistic: the experiments does not account for the richness of the market in the field → simplicity is a key advantage

### 4. Too much emphasis on irrationality and fairness

→ not so much in market games

## 6. Conclusions

- **Davies and Olczak's (2008)** study of DG COMP's merger decisions found much consistency with experimental results, and confirms the decision of the Bundeskartellamt (FCO)
- Experimental methods provide a **reliable, easy, cheap and (relatively) fast data generating method for policy cases**, specifically when there is a lack of experience in a market and if (unambiguous) economic predictions are absent
- With the growth in experimental research and the increased teaching of experimental economics, trust in this method's use in policy cases will rise