Andreas Mundt highlighted a shift in competition policy in his keynote speech, noting that while talk of EU–US divergence is widespread, actual differences remain limited. He observed that competition is no longer universally accepted as the core of economic policy and is increasingly expected to deliver on broader goals, such as innovation, sustainability, and defence. He urged caution against overburdening competition policy with political aims, emphasising the need for clarity and simplicity.

Merger Control and Digital Enforcement

In Germany, recent court rulings have complicated the application of the transaction value threshold, particularly for digital mergers, raising concerns about legal certainty. The outcome of the Facebook/Kustomer case may clarify this. Mundt also addressed the evolving role of economics in enforcement, supporting robust analysis but acknowledging potential presumptions in unilateral conduct cases.

Finally, Mr. Mundt reported progress in Section 19a digital cases, such as timely interventions against Google, and flagged AI markets as a future area of close scrutiny.

The panel “Competition Policy, Green Transition and Competitiveness – Squaring the Circle” was chaired by Hans W. Friederiszick.

The Panellists

• Tomaso Duso (Chairman at the German Monopolies Commission)
• Veronika Grimm (German Council of Economic Experts)
• Andreas Mundt (President at the Bundeskartellamt)
• Lars-Hendrik Röller (Professor of Economics at ESMT Berlin)
• Chair: Hans W. Friederiszick (Director at E.CA Economics)

Panel Summary

The panel examined how competition policy is increasingly expected to support broader goals such as the green transition, industrial strategy, and resilience.

Veronika Grimm warned against excessive regulation that disadvantages German firms, calling instead for outcome-focused rules, technological openness, and streamlined procurement.

Tomaso Duso advocated for an industrial policy that reinforces competition, using defence as an example where targeted, evidence-based support can foster innovation.

Lars-Hendrik Röller emphasised the need to account for geopolitical risks and questioned how broader policy objectives such as resilience and public interest could be integrated without undermining core competition principles.

Andreas Mundt stressed the importance of maintaining clear boundaries in competition law. He noted growing attention to environmental concerns but acknowledged limited legal precedent so far. Defending the Siemens/Alstom merger decision, he warned against politicising antitrust through public interest tests, citing the German “Ministererlaubnis”. On the new DG COMP Commissioner, he expressed hope for continued independence.

Across the discussion, there was consensus that while competition policy must evolve, reducing regulatory burdens may be more urgent than reworking its foundational principles.

Thanks to the panellists for their contributions and the refreshing exchange.

The session “Private Damages in Cartel Cases – Economics in the Courtroom” was chaired by Anselm Mattes, Director at E.CA Economics.

The Panellists

• Kai Brauneisen: Judicial Clerk at the German Federal Constitutional Court and former judge at Mannheim Regional Court, where he was involved in the sugar cartel litigation
• A. Rachel Grinberg: Partner at Bates White Economic Consulting, with extensive experience as an expert witness in US courts
• Derek Ridyard: Member of the UK Competition Appeal Tribunal and former co-founder of RBB Economics
• Florian Smuda: Professor at Koblenz University of Applied Sciences and experienced court-appointed expert in cartel damages cases
• Chair: Anselm Mattes, Director at E.CA Economics

Panel summary

This panel explored the intricate relationship between economics, economists, and the judiciary in private damages actions, particularly in cartel cases. The session began with a provocative question: Could ‘free-handed’ judicial estimation replace expert-driven economic quantification? Although the panellists were unanimous in their answer of “no”, they went on to address the apparent challenges of using economic evidence in courtrooms.

The panel showed how economists, both party- and court-appointed, are involved across jurisdictions, whether judges and economists differ in their fundamental views of each other’s role, and how to address the challenge of diverging expert reports in cartel damages litigation.

The podium also discussed what it would take to align expert economic analysis more closely with judicial objectives, without losing rigour or escalating costs.

Main Takeaways

• Economists need to address the ‘thirst for simplicity’ in cartel proceedings, and avoid getting lost in overly complex analyses and lengthy reports
• Legal experts need to understand that meta studies and simple structural parameters cannot be used to infer damages in specific cases

Thank you to all panellists and the engaged audience for making this such a compelling exchange.

At the E.CA Expert Forum, we had the pleasure of hosting a panel on competition in the Generative Artificial Intelligence Space, chaired by Ela Glowicka.

The panel explored how this transformative technology is reshaping markets and challenging existing regulatory frameworks.

The Panellists

• Max von Thun-Hohenstein Yoshioka, Director of Europe & Transatlantic Partnerships at Open Markets Institute
• Thorsten Kaeseberg, Head of Competition Policy at the German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy
• Carel Maske, Assistent General Counsel at Microsoft
• Chair: Elzbieta Glowicka, Director at E.CA Economics

Main Takeaways

Current regulatory frameworks, like DMA, merger control, antitrust laws, are not equipped to address the speed and complexity of AI-driven competition.

There’s a pressing need for more flexible, forward-looking regulation that ensures legal certainty without stifling innovation. From data ownership to cloud infrastructure and bundling practices, the issues are complex—but essential to get right.

A big thank you to the outstanding panellists and the engaged audience for making this such a remarkable session.

Our director Linda Gratz had the pleasure of chairing the session on the efficiency defence in mobile merger cases.

The Panellists

• Luisa Affuso, Chief Economist and Economics Group Director at Ofcom
• Frank Verboven, Professor of Economics at KU Leuven and fellow of the Centre for Economic Policy Research
• Chair: Linda Gratz, Director at E.CA Economics

Main takeaways

The 4-to-3 mobile merger between Vodafone and Three in the UK received approval, among other reasons, because both firms were no longer covering their cost of capital. Additionally, the UK mobile market was seen as being stuck in a low-price, low-quality equilibrium. The merger is expected to shift the market toward a higher-quality equilibrium, driven by increased network investments.

Empirical evidence on investment effects of past mergers remains inconclusive, partly due to methodological challenges. However, it’s worth noting that even in case of unchanged total market investments, quality may still improve: with fewer networks, lower fixed investments may be needed to deliver comparable — or even better — network quality.

Thanks to both speakers for their insightful presentations and to the many interested participants.

At this year’s Expert Forum, we had the distinct honour of welcoming Teresa Ribera, the Executive Vice-President for a Clean, Just and Competitive Transition of the European Commission. Mrs Ribera gave a keynote speech with the title “The first half year at the helm of EU competition policy”.

She called for a modernised merger control framework that accounts for global pressures and promotes sustainable innovation. Addressing our audience, she invited to participate in the public consultation on the revision of the merger guidelines and to share ideas for making the guidelines fit for the current challenges.

On State aid, she highlighted the need to deploy resources efficiently, accelerate approval processes, and concentrate efforts on strategic sectors to drive the green and digital transitions – all while preserving a level playing field and reinforcing the European dimension, notably through initiatives like the Important Projects of Common European Interest (IPCEI).

In the realm of digital markets, Mrs Ribera stressed the importance of assertive yet balanced enforcement of both new and existing tools to ensure openness, fairness, and accountability.

We are grateful for the opportunity to welcome Mrs Ribera to our conference and feel honoured that she chose to celebrate part of her birthday with us.

In the subsequent fireside chat with Hans W. Friederiszick, Director at E.CA Economics, Mrs Ribera laid out her vision for the future of competition policy in Europe.

The conversation began with an acknowledgement of her strong environmental background and her transition into the role of Competition Commissioner. Mr Friederiszick asked her to reflect on which skills and experiences from her environmental policy career have proven valuable in her new post, and what differences or surprises, positive or negative, she has encountered since taking on the competition portfolio.

Competition Policy, Green Transition, and Competitiveness

The discussion then shifted to the Clean Industrial Deal (CID) and the Net-Zero Industry Act (NZIA), which are central components of the EU’s strategy to boost clean technology manufacturing. Mrs Ribera was asked how competition enforcement can support these initiatives and which notable projects or cases might exemplify this support. A significant concern raised was how competition policy can reconcile traditional effect-based analysis with emerging objectives such as sustainability, fairness, and resilience. In this context, she was asked for her views on potentially incorporating a public interest test into competition law enforcement.

Trade-offs in European Industrial and Competition Policy

The second block explored strategic trade-offs in applying competition rules to strengthen EU competitiveness. The Draghi report was cited, particularly its call for greater openness to consolidation when it enhances global competitiveness, most notably in the telecoms sector. Teresa Ribera was asked where she stands on the tension between market definitions (national vs. European) and the sequencing of liberalisation and mergers.

Finally, she was invited to weigh in on the broader risks of an ambitious EU industrial policy: how to avoid inefficient public spending and entrenching incumbents, while ensuring that private investment, openness, and SME participation remain central to the EU’s approach.

We are very grateful for this insightful exchange and would like to thank Mrs Ribera for sharing her vision and priorities. It was a valuable opportunity to learn more about her strategy for shaping the future of European competition policy.

The session “Ecosystem Competition” was chaired by Thomas Hildebrand.

The Panellists

• Paul Heidhues, Professor of Behavioural and Competition Economics, from Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)
• Eliana Garces, Co-Founder and Principal at LAMA Economic Research
• Chair: Thomas Hildebrand, Director at E.CA Economics

Panel Summary

Paul Heidhues presented his recent paper providing a theoretical model of digital ecosystems. The model assumes that a multi-market firm can steer users towards its products in other markets.

This is the reason why a market leader at a so-called “access point” derives a high value from offering services in adjacent markets. The implication is that taking over firms in adjacent markets is very profitable. Because the firm at the access point can threaten to acquire and steer users towards the target firm’s competitor, it can even acquire the target at a discount.

This can explain why ecosystems grow out of market leaders at access points. The model further shows that while consumers often benefit in the short run from the consolidation of good services, ecosystem’s takeovers and dominance in access points decrease the incentives for entry and innovation, harming consumers in the long run.

Eliana Garces, who was the discussant, agreed that the paper provided a good starting point for developing a framework of digital ecosystems, yet highlighted that refinements would be needed for each specific case.

She further provided pro-competitive rationales for ecosystem formation, as digital platforms help solve market failures and coordination problems, such as delivering reach through aggregation and connectivity, providing data insights that lead to matching, and facilitating synergies through shared technology tools or coordination for joint investments and innovation.

Thanks to the speakers and the many participants for their contributions, which made this panel an compelling exchange.

The session “Understanding Market Power and Competitiveness” was chaired by Alexis Walckiers.

The Panellists

• Vincent Verouden (European Commission)
• Elena Argentesi (University of Bologna)
• Damien Neven (University of Geneva)
• Chair: Alexis Walckiers, E.CA Economics

Panel Summary

Several decision-makers, particularly in France and Germany, denounce the restrictive role played by merger control, which, according to them, has prevented the emergence of ‘European champions’ and therefore hampered growth. The panel, therefore, sought to gain a deeper understanding of the relationship between competition, market power, and competitiveness.

Vincent Verouden reminded us of the fact that since 2015, economists have produced significant new research and conducted a lively debate on the “rise of market power”, highlighting such factors as rising concentration, markups, profits and entrenchment.

Indicators of competition (concentration, markups, profits, dynamics) suggest that, on average and across a wide range of sectors, the intensity of competition in the EU is probably weaker than it was 25 years ago. The main drivers behind these changes appear to be technological change (rise of ICT and other intangibles), globalisation, but also regulatory barriers to entry and the rise of M&A.

Elena Argentesi focused on domestic competition and export performance. The main question is to what extent competition fosters both the productivity and the competitiveness of firms on the global stage. She argued that competition in input markets has an unambiguously positive effect on export performance (lower costs and higher quality of inputs).

While competition on the domestic market has both a positive impact through increased incentives to innovate and improve quality, it also has a negative effect to the extent that competition prevents firms from reaching the scale that enables them to compete effectively in international markets.

Based on a survey of European companies, she confirmed that competition in upstream markets, particularly for goods, is perceived as one of the main determinants of export success. Sixty-seven per cent of respondents also consider that competition in the domestic market improves exports.

Damien Neven discussed the interaction between competition and subsidies for innovation. He first reminded the audience that, in a Schumpeterian context, encouraging firms to operate in the same sector and on an equal footing will induce them to resort to improve their productivity via innovation in order to escape competition with each other, which, in turn, fosters productivity growth.

Evidence shows that Chinese support has been particularly effective when encouraging competition (shipbuilding, electric cars, solar panels).

Thanks to the panellists and all participants for their contributions.

The session “Economic Analysis in Competition Cases” was chaired by Rainer Nitsche and included the keynote speech by Emanuele Tarantino.

The Panellists

• Eric Emch (Partner at Bates White)
• Chiara Fumagalli (Professor of Economics at Bocconi University)
• Sandro Gleave (Chief Economist of the Bundeskartellamt)
• Emanuele Tarantino (Chief Economist at the European Commission)
• Hans Zenger (Chief Economist Team, European Commission)
• Chair: Rainer Nitsche (Director at E.CA Economics)

Panel Summary

The keynote by Emanuele Tarantino focused on competition and industrial policy for digital technologies. He recognised the interrelation between competition and innovation, particularly in the context of mergers in digital markets, an area where the European Commission has had a tangible impact. He explained the main goal to fix the productivity gap in Europe, keeping markets contestable and helping startups grow.

Emanuele, therefore, referred to the strategic combination of merger control and industrial policy to spur innovation. As an example, he mentioned Article 22 referral cases that were and were not successful in that regard. He stressed out the fact that incentives matter (e.g. the probability of killing projects of a startup). If there are adverse incentives, cases should often not be allowed with remedies, particularly if they won’t change the incentives to begin with.

The high-calibre panel started with an overview of the role of economics in US proceedings. Eric Emch reported on the pushback against economic analysis at the beginning of the Biden administration and its manifestations. He explained that the new 2023 Merger Guidelines, in parts, took a more legal tone, naming the example of market definition, which refers to case law that is difficult to justify on economic grounds. However, according to his assessment, in practice, economics continues to play a significant role in American antitrust court cases, as it has in the past. That means courts seem not to have changed their approach in response to the new guidelines so far.

Turning to Europe and how to best incorporate economics into cases, Chiara Fumagalli clarified that the consumer welfare standard is not only about price effects, but also about quality, innovation, and long-term effects, which can be perfectly captured with a consumer welfare standard. Economic methods should, therefore, not only focus on analysing prices.

According to her assessment, the use of economics in Article 102 proceedings in the past has been inefficient and misguided – cases have taken too long, and empirical price-cost tests have often been uninformative. Economic tools need to be better targeted to cases where they are applicable. Moreover, economics can and should also inform presumptions-based or ex-ante regulation (such as the DMA), as the underlying rules must be grounded in sound economic principles.

Referring to his extensive experience with assessing mergers at the Bundeskartellamt, Sandro Gleave, emphasised the importance of identifying the right theory of harm based on sound economic principles. In practice, for capacity reasons, agencies often need to base their assessment on simpler but still robust analyses, instead of engaging in complex methods. Sandro emphasised the importance of transparency on assumptions and steps taken in whatever analysis is performed.

Hans Zenger explained that the Chief Economist Team of the European Commission considers empirical economic evidence as critical. Indeed, there was general agreement on the panel that sound economics is key and does not always require complex methods. Instead, the focus should be on robust methods and theories of harm that are consistent with the stylised facts of the case.

Thanks to the panellists and all participants for their contributions.