Juri Demuth
Principal
Dr Juri Demuth is a Principal in the Berlin office. Since joining E.CA Economics first in September 2013, Juri has worked on projects for clients in numerous industries, in all fields of competition policy, before the European Commission or national competition authorities, including Germany and Austria.
Juri has extensive experience advising clients in major merger proceedings (e.g. Telefónica/E-Plus, Lafarge/Holcim, RHI/Magnesita). He has conducted overcharge and damage assessments in private litigation cases following cartel investigations. Furthermore, he has worked on abuse of dominance projects. His experience covers a variety of industries including the telecommunications, refractory, cement, payment card, air cargo, forestry, waste management and fast-moving consumer goods (e.g. meat, flour) sectors.
Juri holds a Doctoral degree in Economics from Freie Universität Berlin and is a graduate of the Berlin Doctoral Program in Economics & Management Science. In his thesis, Juri applied microeconomic theory to questions in the fields of industrial organisation and regulation. Juri additionally obtained a diploma degree in Physics from Freie Universität Berlin.
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- Doctoral degree in Economics, Freie Universität Berlin
- Diploma degree in Physics (Physics major, Economics minor), Freie Universität Berlin
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- Papers & reports
Reverse Privatization as a Reaction to the Competitive Environment: Evidence from Solid Waste Collection in Germany
Hans W. Friederiszick, Juri Demuth, S. Reinhold, Review of Industrial Organization 60, 217–261, October 2022- Papers & reports
Reverse privatization as a reaction to the competitive environment: Evidence from solid waste collection in Germany
Hans W. Friederiszick, Juri Demuth, Steffen Reinhold, ESMT Working Paper 18-02, SSRN, RePEc, EconStor, April 2018The named persons have published a working paper exploring the motives for reverse privatisation of the provision of solid waste collection services by German municipalities. Using a unique panel data set the authors show that municipalities do not only react to cost advantages of private companies but also to the competitive environment.
- Cartels and other anti-competitive agreements
- Papers & reports
Remunicipalization and Competition in the Waste management Industry
- Papers & reports
- Regulated industries and market design
Signalling Rivalry and Quality Uncertainty in a Duopoly
Juri Demuth, Helmut Bester, Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, DOI 10.1007/s10842-014-0178-0, June 2014